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BdP Bank of Portugal 
EAD Exposure at Default 
EU European Union 
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECHP European Community Household Panel 
EU-SILC European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
FM Financial Margin 
HFCS Household Finance and Consumption Survey 
ICOR Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
ILFPP Survey of Financial Literacy of Portuguese Population 
INE Statistics Portugal 
ISFF Survey on the Financial Situation of Households 
LGD Loss Given Default 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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This research investigates the financial vulnerability of Portuguese households and the 
impact of macroeconomic shocks on it. The empirical analysis is mainly based on 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU – SILC 2010) for 
Portugal (5,182 households). Using stress test methodologies, the financial stress of 
households is identified, adopting measures of different levels of vulnerability based 
on financial margins. Three types of scenario are constructed to assess the impact on 
family vulnerability of three different types of shocks: an increase in the interest rate, 
an increase in the unemployment rate and a decrease on income.   The empirical 
results show that the vulnerability of households is weakly affected by rises in the 
interest rate. By contrast,   the rise in unemployment and the decline in the level of 
household income have a high impact. These computed effects converge with other 
empirical studies recently conducted in other European countries. The comparison 
between the households’ situation before and after the economic and financial crisis 
suggests a dramatic worsening of the financial vulnerability of households, particularly 
those in the lowest quartile of income and households composed by a single parent or 
couples with dependent children. 
 Keywords: Stress testing; vulnerability of families; European Union Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions SILC; Portugal; Household finance. 







In recent decades, household debt has increased exponentially in most developed 
economies. The combination of this increase with the recent crisis has drawn attention 
to the financial vulnerability of households and the sustainability of the financial 
system. The years before 2007, characterized by a reduction of credit restrictions, the 
creation of new financial products and easy access to banks contributed to a very 
significant increase in the households’ indebtedness in most of the OECD countries, 
particularly in Portugal. Costa & Farinha (2012) show that in 2010, about 40 % of 
Portuguese households are indebted. According to Anioła & Gołas (2012), the results 
of survey data (EC Report, Fondeville et al., 2010) indicate that in 2009 the level of 
household debt in Portugal exceeded the total income of Portuguese households, and 
it stood at 116.8 %, up from 94.4% in 2005. These values were higher than those of the 
average of countries in the European Union (EU), which rose from 80 % in 2005 to 96.9 
% in 2009. 
Currently,  with restrictions on access to credit, high unemployment and reduced 
incomes, reduced savings (in 2010 only  50 % of the Portuguese population declares 
being able to save (BdP, 2011c)), and the decrease in the value of assets in particular 
real estate, households face difficulties in meeting their debt service, and this could 
thus affect the stability of the financial system. According to Leigh et al. (2012) the 
decrease  in  economic activity in most developed countries is just too great to result 





The decrease is "the combination of house price declines and prebust leverage that 
explains the severity of the contraction” (Leigh et al. 2012, p. 115). 
At the macroeconomic level, according to Jenkins et al. (2011) a similar reduction in 
GDP may have considerably different implications on living standards in different 
countries. The impact of a decrease in income on living standards of a country which 
has been softened by government policies (and probably an increase in public deficit) 
is significantly different from the effects where the decrease in income is fully 
transferred to household finances. This perspective is particularly important for 
Portugal since according to the Memorandum of Understanding (Governo de Portugal, 
2011) the Portuguese economic policy authorities are committed to reducing the 
public deficit through measures that directly or indirectly affect household income. 
Thus, the study of financial vulnerability of households in the Portuguese case gains 
greater relevance since the loss of income for households and firms leads to a reduced 
ability to comply with the debt service of the private sector and in turn possible losses 
in the banking system. 
The European Banking Authority, in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk 
Board, conducted a stress test in various EU financial institutions, with the aim of 
testing resilience against adverse shocks. The assumptions aimed to assess the capital 
adequacy of banks considering a capital ratio of Core Tier 1 of 5%. The adverse 
scenario associated with the stress test was set by the European Central Bank (ECB) for 
the period 2011 and 2012 (BdP, 2011a). In Portugal, this test was conducted by the 





represented about two thirds of the total assets of the Portuguese financial system in 
2010 (BdP, 2011b). The test took December 2010 as a reference date and assumed 
various scenarios for 2011 and 2012. The adverse scenarios included, among others, an 
increase in short-term rates (Euribor 3 months) and an increase in unemployment 
(BdP, 2011a). The test results carried out in 2010 showed that the banks had reached 
the suitable level of capital.  
Campbell (2006), states that one of the challenges of studying the Household Finance 
is that the behavior of households is difficult to measure accurately. The results 
suggest that many families are reasonable investor but a minority, poorer and less 
educated, still make serious mistakes, such as not participating in risky assets markets, 
the low diversification of portfolios and the non-mortgage refinancing. 
A recent review of household finance literature also stresses these issues (Guiso & 
Sodini, forthcoming).  
The purpose of this research is to study the financial vulnerability of Portuguese 
families and how it is affected by adverse macroeconomic shocks, adapting some 
prospective assumptions (interest rate, unemployment and income) of the stress tests 
carried out in banks. The methodologies used were developed in the empirical 
literature on household debt and built on the definition of a financial margin of the 
households. Basically the financial margin is computed by subtracting from the 
household disposable income some spending assumed to be a minimum (for example, 
to meet the basic needs of the household members). Because different margins are 





vulnerable household is defined as a household with a negative financial margin. The 
construction of two different types of scenarios is based on adverse shocks. With the 
prospective analysis, the research aims to test the resilience of households to changes 
in crucial variables for the level of financial stress, quantifying the increase in the share 
of vulnerable households. The study is carried out at an aggregate level (total 
households) and by types of families depending on their composition and level of 
income. Although the negative effects on the ability of the households to meet debt 
service also impact on the banking system, this indirect impact is beyond the scope of 
the current dissertation.  
 The empirical section of this research is mainly based on the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU - SILC) for Portugal, using 2010 data, the last 
available micro data for EU-SILC (INE, 2012c). The data used can reflect the effects of 
two years of crisis, which is taken to start in late 2007. The studies conducted before 
the current financial crisis (Johansson & Persson (2006), Vatne (2006), Gomez-Salvador 
et al. (2011), Farinha (2003), Farinha (2004), Farinha & Noorali (2004), Farinha (2007)) 
do not yet consider this dramatic decrease in household income and the potential 
losses for banks and consequent consequences in the stability of the financial system.   
This research adds value in different aspects: (i) it adapts to Portugal methodologies 
already applied in other EU countries as for example Albacete & Fessler (2010), who 
conducted a stress test to assess the financial vulnerability of Austrian households; (ii) 
it analyses a period after crisis; (iii) it can be compared with other studies also based 





and future losses in the domestic banking sector as well as provide clues on how to 
avoid them; and (v) the methodologies applied here help to overcome the time gap 
between collection and diffusion of information collected by large household surveys. 
For example, the EU-SILC 2010 microdata are only available 2 years after being 
collected (Table A I in Appendix). For Banks the recent rapid progression of private 
debt (households and firms) is hard to capture in detail in a timely manner (BdP, 2012). 
This dissertation is organized into three sections. Section 1 will present a brief 
literature review on household financial stress. Section 2 characterizes the database 
used, presents the methodology and lastly the results for household vulnerability and 
the impact of adverse shocks are presented and discussed. Section 3 lists the main 
conclusions of the study and suggests future research avenues. 
1 Stress tests and Household indebtedness – A brief literature review 
Testing household financial stress - i.e. the application of macroeconomic shocks on 
household financial margins and identifying household financial vulnerability - is a 
relevant research topic in a context of economic and financial crisis. Currently there 
are changes in the behavior of the households, who have found themselves compelled 
to change to ensure their financial survival. Some empirical studies have been carried 
out on the ability of households to pay their financial obligations after the occurrence 
of macroeconomic adverse shocks (household test of stress) and on the impact that 
any defaults arising from those shocks may have on the banking system. These studies 





follows a distinction is made between studies undertaken before and after the current 
crisis began, in the end of 2007. 
1.1 Household Financial Vulnerability and Impact on the Banking System - 
studies before the crisis 
1.1.1 The Portuguese Case 
Farinha (2007) uses the Heritage Survey of Families and Debt /Inquérito ao Património 
e Endividamento das Famílias (IPEF) for 2006/2007 and applies a regression to identify 
the effects on household debt of some socio-economic factors (e.g. income, age, 
education level, employment status). She found that debt is particularly sensitive to 
household income and the age of the household representative, and the states of 
greater vulnerability appear in families with lower income levels or whose 
representative is young. The situation is partially mitigated by the existence of 
collateral, since in most housing loans in Portugal the house is given as warranty to 
banks, so, housing loans generally are considered low risk, assuming that housing 
prices are not overvalued. Additionally, Farinha (2007) argues that banks have limited 
the effect of rising interest rates on families through debt restructuring, i.e. increasing 
the maturity of the loan. The results based on IPEF show that the total debt of 
vulnerable families (low income and young) or which may become vulnerable 
(unemployed) represents a relatively low weight in total debt to banks. However some 
data and assumptions in Farinha (2007) have become outdated. For example, the value 





of the average value per square meter of housing for the country stood at 1,039 euros, 
which represents a negative growth of 7.9% compared to June 2011. 
 
1.1.2. Other studies 
Johansson & Persson (2006) studied the effects that increasing interest rates and an 
increase in the unemployment rate may have on the ability of Swedish families to 
meet debt and the subsequent potential losses in the banking sector. They use micro 
data taken from Statistics Sweden for Swedish Household 2004 and they calculate the 
household financial margin as a measure of household vulnerability. The financial 
margin is defined as the amount of income remaining after payment of debt service 
and the acquisition of essential goods (i.e. household disposable income net of debt 
service minus essential expenses, such as food, clothing, electricity, etc.). The authors 
assume that households with negative financial margins will go into default and 
therefore they have a probability of default equal to 1. On the basis of this assumption, 
they calculate the possible bank losses by deducting the household’s debt from its 
wealth. They conclude that households are much more sensitive to interest rate 
changes than to changes in unemployment. At the time of their analysis (2004), the 
crisis had not yet begun and, as such, it was unlikely that the result of the household 
debt would cause significant banking losses. This view is no longer valid today.  
Vatne (2006) uses micro data for Norway   for the period 1987 to 2004 to calculate the 
financial margin, which is defined as the household net assets after payment of debts 





Norwegian households with negative margin decreased from the late 1980s until 2004, 
which, ceteris paribus, gave rise to a reduction in the credit risk associated with bank 
loans. 
Gomez-Salvador et al. (2011) use micro data from the EU-SILC for the year 2007 in 
order to generate information for the Eurozone on household debt. They   conclude 
that the probability of having a housing loan increases with the degree of income and, 
as a function of age, it does not have a linear behavior: it first increases and then 
decreases in the older age groups. They also conclude that the lower the level of 
income, the greater the vulnerability of the household debt service. In addition, the 
authors point out the particular nature of the current financial crisis, which has 
reduced the options that families have to mitigate interest rate shocks due to falling 
house prices and increases in uncertainty about income. 
Fuenzalida & Ruiz-Tagle (2009), using a survey for the Chilean population in 2004, 
concluded that financial stability can be affected by the behavior of households 
towards adverse macroeconomic conditions, with the financial vulnerability of 
households dependent on the level of debt and income. When applying a shock on the 
unemployment rate, they conclude that financial stability is not significantly affected. 
Herrala & Kauko (2007) using data from Statistics Finland regarding 2004 conclude that 
the debt of vulnerable households is insensitive to shocks in the unemployment rate, 
in the interest rate and in housing prices. The shock of the interest rate has a more 
significant impact than the others shocks, although moderate, mainly because most of 





1.2 Household Debt and Impact on the Banking System – after the crisis 
Unlike the financial stress tests for banks that are being applied for several years, 
stress test to households and the associated methodologies are being conducted 
recently and are fomented by the growing interest in identifying the effects of the 
crisis on the financial situation of individuals (households and companies), banking 
system and the mutual negative interactions that may occur. These studies have been 
conducted in several countries, for example in Austria (Albacete & Fessler, 2010), 
Croatia (Sugawara & Zalduendo, 2011), Finland (Petr Jakubik, 2011), Italy (Magri & 
Pico, 2011), or groups of countries such as EU countries (Anioła & Gołas, 2012; 
Fondeville et al., 2010), Asian countries (Tiongson et al., 2010). This paper applies for 
the first time these tests to Portugal. 
The adopted methodologies to evaluate the financial stress are varied. For example 
application of risk indicators (Dinh et al., 2012) or determination of simple measures of 
vulnerability based on net interest income of households (Albacete & Fessler, 2010). 
The latter methodology will be adopted in this dissertation because the achieved 
results are comparable with the previous empirical literature, plus it allows a first 
approach to an issue study for the first time for the Portuguese case. 
Regarding databases adopted for stress testing households, questionnaires from 
Eurostat (Magri & Pico, 2011), from central banks of different countries (Faruqui et al., 
2012; Holló & Papp, 2007), for specific research projects (Anderloni et al., 2012) and 
others are used. In the present investigation the essential information used is the EU-





countries where it has not been used and still enables an analysis to the same 
individuals / households over time because EU-SILC is an annual panel survey. 
 
1.2.1 The Portuguese Case  
Eurostat surveyed families about the propensity to over-indebtedness through a 
special ad hoc module (EU-SILC 2008 Module on Over-Indebtedness and Financial 
Exclusion) included in EU-SILC 2008, which contains specific questions about amount of 
debt and credit debt. The focus of the analysis is “on households whose aggregate 
debts amount to over 100% of monthly disposable income” (Fondeville et al. 2010, 
p.27); however, the information collected by the ad-hoc module is mainly about the 
status of the households two years prior to the date of the survey (2008), so it does 
not fully reflect the effects of the crisis.  The information collected precludes the 
possibility of distinguishing between situations of long-term debt and temporary 
borrowing, or if families increase credit demand to avoid a decrease in the 
expenditures. According to this study, housing loans represent a large share of total 
household debt in all EU countries, and Portugal is one of the countries where this 
phenomenon is increasing. While EU housing loans represent 67.9% of the household 
disposable income in 2009 (52.6% in 2005), these values for Portugal were 93.0% in 
2009 (75% in 2005). According to Fondeville et al. (2010, p.21) “it is evident that there 
is no simple relationship between the growth of household credit in relation to income 
and the relative number of households experiencing financial difficulties”. This result is 
not surprising given that some years ago access to credit access was easier and credit 





question is therefore to investigate whether household income is increasing in 
proportion to the debt service and, if not, what is the extension of this gap.  
Furthermore, according to Fondeville et al. (2010) the proportion of Portuguese 
households showing delays in payments decreased between 2007 and 2008, from 
6.6% to 5.0%. However, the proportion of Portuguese households who reported 
“difficulty in making ends meet” rose from 37.2% in 2007 to 45.3% in 2008. Therefore, 
the increased difficulty in meeting the commitments of the households was not 
accompanied by an increase in the percentage of households of families with late 
payments. 
Using data for the period between January and May 2010, from the Central de Créditos 
[Central Credit Register], which is managed by Bank of Portugal (Portuguese Central 
Bank) and compiles information provided by all credit institutions operating in 
Portugal, Farinha & Lacerda (2010) estimate the impact of several factors on credit 
delinquency. The concept of credit delinquency adopted by the authors is defined as 
when the borrower has credit delay in a specific segment (housing loans, car loans, 
credit cards, other consumer loans and other credit) for at least three consecutive 
months. 
Farinha & Lacerda (2010) show that defaults on housing loans differ significantly from 
those observed in other segments of credit; default rates associated with housing 
loans (which in Portugal account for about 75% of household credit) tend to be 
significantly lower than in any other household credit segment. Furthermore, the 





default in all other segments. This result can be interpreted as a sign that the housing 
credit is authorized to households that have a lower risk of default because they tend 
to have higher levels of income and assets. 
1.2.2 Other studies 
Albacete & Fessler (2010) using several micro data, including the EU - SILC 2008, apply 
a stress test to Austrian households and assess the risk of financial instability resulting 
from the household indebtedness. They define a financial margin for households with 
debt and then, introducing different economic shocks (e.g. changes in interest rates), 
study their impact on financial margins. The financial margin is defined as household 
disposable income minus basic consumption and debt service. They conclude that 
Austrian households who hold the largest share of household debt have higher levels 
of education, income and wealth. The economic shock that has the greatest impact is 
the increase in interest rate. The computed potential bank losses resulting from 
adverse shocks applied to households do not reveal to threaten stability of the 
Austrian financial sector. 
2 Empirical Analysis 
2.1  Data bases and Methodology 
2.1.1 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) EU 
- SILC 
The micro data base used in the empirical work is  the European Union Statistics on 







the latest data available of SILC (INE, 2012c). In the methodological document (INE, 
2009) about SILC and on the Eurostat website (Eurostat, 2012) there is a detailed 
explanation of the survey methodology and content. Although the EU-SILC, successor 
to the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), "is not a pure household finance 
survey, it contains relevant information for the analysis of household indebtedness" 
(Gomez-Salvador et al., 2011, p. 12) and the study of financial vulnerability of 
households. The differences and similarities between the two surveys (SILC vs. ECHP) 
are discussed in Eurostat (2005).  
The EU-SILC – in Portuguese Inquérito às Condições de Vida e Rendimento (ICOR) –  
started in 2004, and it provides standardized information for the countries of the EU, is 
collected in an annual basis based on a sample of about 5,000 households. Table AI in 
Appendix summarizes some of the existing information about household financial 
situation in Portugal and EU and provide some examples of empirical literature which 
uses those surveys results. The Tables AII and AIII in the Appendix select the questions 
and list the main information topics   in EU-SILC 2010 that are relevant to the present 
research. For example the minimum income needed as it is perceived by respondents 
(Question A39, Table A III in Appendix). 
2.1.2 Other Sources of Information 
This section presents briefly some results relevant to the analysis and obtained from 
other databases than the EU-SILC. The Inquérito à Situação Financeira das Famílias 
(ISFF) conducted in 2010 is part of the European  Household Finance and Consumption 





obtain a detailed characterization of the financial situation of the households in a 
comparable manner across the Euro zone countries.  It is expected that HFCS data will 
be published in 2013 (Table A I in Appendix). 
BdP & INE (2012) indicates that 75% of individuals who worked in the three years 
preceding the survey report that they did not felt a deterioration of working conditions 
during the three years preceding the survey and 15% lost their jobs. 10 % of families 
stated that their expenses in the 12 months before to the survey were higher than 
their income in the same period, and to manage this most households use their 
savings. Regarding the reason for the realization of savings, more than half of the total 
household states that is for funding unexpected events. BdP & INE (2012) also show 
that approximately 40% of households are indebted, and 25% constituted mortgages 
on their primary residence.  
The Inquérito à Literacia Financeira da População Portuguesa (ILFPP) [Survey of 
Financial Literacy Portuguese Population (ILFPP)], is published by the Bank of Portugal 
and is within the scope of supervision role of central bank. The financial crisis has 
reinforced the importance of financial literacy as a way to promote the stability of the 
financial system (BdP, 2011c). In 2010, 48% of ILFPP’s respondents do not save and of 
these 88% is because the income does not allow it. Those who save, 44% do it 
irregulary, using for example, the Holiday Pay or the Christmas Pay. When asked about 
the reason for saving 58% of respondents declared that it is to cover unforeseen costs 
and only 6% mentioned the intention to use the savings in future retirement. Most of 
the the respondents with loans (about 22% of total) say they have never made  





2.1.3  Sample (Portugal, 2010) 
The sample EU-SILC 2010 in Portugal includes 5,182 households and 11,380 individuals.  
According to the original variables approximately 28% of households report no 
capacity to handle unexpected expenses, of which 55% are composed of one adult 
with one or more children dependents, and about 80% say they feel it difficult to make 
customary charges and ends meet (see Tables A IV, A V, AVI, A VIIa and A VIIb in 
Appendix). Surprisingly, the percentage of families who claims to have delayed 
payment of rent or monthly mortgage loan is low (7%). However, the answer to this 
question (Tables A VIIa and A VIIb in Appendix) have a very high percentage of missings 
approximately 53% , suggesting an underestimation of the cases of delayed payments. 
Additionally, almost all households (98%) that have delays in the payment of rent or 
monthly mortgage loan also feel it difficult to make ends meet. 
2.1.4 Methodology – Stress Tests 
There is a large gap between the date of collection of data from households and the 
date of release of the information, so there is a delay in diagnosis of the vulnerability 
of families when large household surveys are used. This dissertation contributes to 
overcome that gap.  
The total household debt as a percentage of the disposable income is accurate 
measure for market risk monitoring (Vatne, 2006). A high proportion of debt in 
relation to disposable income can lead to a reduction of expenditure by households, a 





to pay debt service and finally losses in banks, direct consequence of the adverse 
financial situation of households and firms (Albacete & Fessler, 2010). 
The process of computing the number of vulnerable households before and after the 
testing of stress and the existence of potential bank losses is developed following four 
phases. These phases are summarized in Figure 1. The software used was SPSS 14.0 
(Norusis, 2002) and STATA 9 (Hamilton, 2004). 
 
Figures 1 and the description of the four phases include the calculation of the 
parameters Exposure at Default (EAD) and Loss Given Default (LDG). However those 
measures are not calculated in this study due to lacking data. The calculation of both 
indicators (EAD and LGD) requires a detailed knowledge of total household debt, as 





information is not available in micro data, existing only in tabulated format (e.g. 
Farinha & Lacerda, 2010). 
In general, applying the stress test to households involves a sequence of procedures: 
calculating baseline figures; identifying vulnerable households; subjecting households 
to shocks, e.g. unemployment shock or interest rate shock (Tiongson et al., 2010). 
The present research will be developed in three phases. 
Phase 1- Vulnerability Measures  
For the identification of vulnerable households financial margins are computed. Being 
at financial risk means a negative margin. The empirical literature has multiple 
examples of financial margins evaluation. Financial margin represents the proportion 
of the income of each family that becomes available after completion of debt service 
and payment of current expenses (Johansson & Persson, 2006), so the financial margin 
is "a measure of how well the household is able to make ends meet "(Albacete & 
Fessler, 2010, p 78). It is through the financial margin that the resilience of families will 
be monitored when adverse macroeconomic shocks happen. For example, comparing 
the vulnerability measures before and after an income decrease or an increase in 
interest rate or unemployment rate.   
One way of computing the margin for each household is: 
 (1a) FMj= Yj – (BCj + DSj).                         (j= 1, …, n)  
Where, Yj is the monthly household disposable income (Tables A VI, A VIIIa and A VIIIb 





debt service. The sum of these two expenditures is obtained directly from the EU-SILC 
2010 (question A39, variable HS130, Tables A II, A III, A VIIIa and A VIIIb in Appendix). 
The amount used for the calculation of net interest income on basic consumption and 
debt service is given by the answer to the question " Tell about what is the minimum 
monthly income needed to make usual ends meet" (Albacete and Fessler, 2010), 
variable HS130. Gomez-Salvador et al. (2011, p. 32) states that the "total cost housing" 
"includes mortgage interest payments, structural insurance, mandatory services and 
charges, regular maintenance and repairs, taxes and the cost of utilities, current 
monthly cost" . 
Using the same database other financial margin can be computed. This dissertation 
suggests a new margin calculated as: 
(1b) FMUj= Yj – (BCj + DSj) – Unexpectj.                       (j= 1, …, n) 
Where, the variables have the same meaning that (1a) and Unexpectj is unexpected 
expenses. The value of unexpected expenses in the present research is fixed in 400 
Euros (question A37, EU SILC 2010, Tables A II and A III in Appendix).  
A different group of measures is based on relative values, for example the share of 
margin on disposable income. Figures 2 to 5 show graphically these indicators 
distributed by deciles (deciles were calculated based on the variable household income 
per adult equivalent) for the total family (Figures 2 and 3) and only to households 
holding loans (Figures 4 and 5). The households in the bottom decile have negative 





disposable income.  The households in the upper decile have on average a positive 
margin representing approximately 30% of the disposable income (Figure 2). 
 
When the unexpected expenditures are deducted, only the households belonging to 
the top decile hold , on average, positive margin (Figure 3).For families with housing 
loans, it appears that in the bottom deciles the share of negative margin in disposable 
income is slightly lower than for the total households (with and without housing loans) 
(Figure 4). The results obtained through the EU-SILC 2010 (Figures 4 and 5) suggest 
that families with housing loans earn more on average. Results shown by   Farinha & 
Lacerda (2010) using a different database (Central Credit Register, managed by Bank 
Portugal) converge with this. 
 
Source:   Figures constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.
(*)   Deciles based on Income per Adult Equivalent from EU-SILC. Percentual Margem computed as: 
       (Disposable Income - Minimum Income to meet expenses and charges ) / Disposable Income. Percentual Margem After Unexpected Expenses 
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FIGURE 2– Mean of Percentual Margin by Deciles for All Households
(N= 5,040).*
FIGURE 3– Mean of Percentual Margin After Unexpected Expenses by   
Deciles for All Households  (N= 5,040).*
FIGURE 4– Mean of Percentual Margin by Deciles only for Households 
with  Mortgage Loans (N= 1,126).*
FIGURE 5– Mean of Percentual Margin After Unexpected Expenses by 





Phase 2- Vulnerable Households Identification – Probability of Default 
Using the previous vulnerability measures is possible to classify households according 
to vulnerability levels. 
For the qualitative analysis of the situation of families two dummy variables were 
created associated with positive and negative margins. It is assumed that the 
probability of default of the household j (PDj) is equal to 1 if its financial margin is 
negative and equal to 0 otherwise: 
                           1 if  FMj <0 
(2) PDj=                                                     (j= 1, …, n) 
                           0 otherwise.  
 
 
(3) EAD= ((∑ j PDj Dj) / ∑ j Dj) x 100.                                                          (j= 1, …, n)  
Where, Dj is household debt.   
 
(4) LGD= ((∑ j PDj Nj) / ∑ j Dj) x 100.                           (j= 1, …, n)  
Where, Nj is the debt deducted from the aggregate household wealth. 
A method of calculating the variables FM, PD, EAD and LGD was proposed by Albacete 
& Fessler (2010) and Johansson & Persson (2006). Due to lack of information available 
the last two variables described (EAD and LGD) are not calculated. In fact, "The EU-SILC 
Does Not Provide direct estimate of the overall debt service, but only of interest 
payments on mortgage debt (excluding capital payments)." (Gomez-Salvador et al., 






Based on the margins (in value and as percentage) three vulnerability levels were 
identified according to the following criteria (see also Table A VIIIa in Appendix): 
- Vulnerability Level 1: It builds on the assumption of vulnerability in a broader sense. It 
means Disposable Income deducted of the Basic Needs Expenditures (self-perceived). 
Albacete & Fessler (2010) and Johansson & Persson (2006) compute this indicator; 
- Vulnerability Level 2: It is assumed that a family is vulnerable only when the negative 
margin as a percentage of disposable income reaches a value of -20%; 
- Vulnerability Level 3: Part of the first but additionally includes unexpected expenses 
in the amount of 400 Euros, that is, according to this criterion a family is considered 
vulnerable if the financial margin computed previously (vulnerability 1) less 400 Euros 
is negative. 
Although the percentage of households with negative margins, i.e. the proportion of 
families at risk, is a good proxy measure of household resilience against different 
shocks, this is not sufficient for calculation of possible bank losses. So, the knowledge 
about vulnerability of households improves when the proportion of assets and 
liabilities held by these vulnerable families are taking into account (Albacete & Fessler, 
2010 and Johansson & Persson, 2006). 
Brief diagnosis of the vulnerability of Portuguese households: 
The descriptive statistics calculated are shown in Table A VIIIb in Appendix. According 





value decrease to 20.4% when the financial margin with unexpected expenses is 
applied. It should be noted that these values are different from those calculated by INE 
to identify families with severe material deprivation that are 10.4%. 
The degree of vulnerability by level and income quartile is presented in Table A IX in 
Appendix where is shown that vulnerability, as expected, is more intense in low 
income levels. Throughout this analysis the 1
st
 quartile represents the households with 
lower incomes and the 4
th
 quartile represents the households with higher incomes. 
These results are consistent with those calculated in accordance with the original 
variables contained in the EU-SILC 2010, where about 49% of households in the 1st 
quartile income report no capacity to withstand unexpected expenses and 95% of 
families belonging to the same quartile of income claim to have difficulty making ends 
meet and customary charges (Table A IV in Appendix). The percentage of households 
with negative margin is in line with the other levels of vulnerability here computed: 
57.7%, 44.4% and 79.6%, respectively (Table A IX in Appendix). 
Considering the composition of the household, the households who are most 
vulnerable, according to the three levels mentioned are families consisting of 'an adult 
with one or more dependent children', 76%, 64% and 92% have a negative financial 
margin; this group is followed by families composed of individuals living alone, 70%, 
55% and 93% hold a negative financial margin (Table A X in Appendix). 
The identified vulnerability based on the three measures reaches higher levels than the 
vulnerability arising from direct questions included in the questionnaire (e.g. severe 





vulnerability calculated in this research and the poverty indicator directly obtained by 
questionnaire, according to which 21.3% of the households are below the poverty line. 
Phase 3- Test 'Stress' and changing the number of vulnerable households 
The application of 'Stress Test' contributes to the identification of the families that, 
before and/or after adverse shocks (e.g. decrease in income, increased in interest rate 
and increase in unemployment rate) have vulnerable status. 
2.2 Stress Test Scenarios: Results and Discussion 
2.2.1 Scenario of Increase in Interest Rate 
Three scenarios are considered for interest rate: variation of 1.3 percentage points 
(pp), 2 pp and 3 pp. These variations follows the assumptions for test of stress of 
Portuguese banks (with time horizon of two years, 2011-2012; 3-month Euribor, end of 
period values) that passage the base value of 1.5% to 2.8%, i.e. 1.3% increase (BoP, 
2011a). In this study, the base rate is unknown for what was decided to use the three 
values previously mentioned. The impact of a rise in interest rate is dependent on the 
type of interest (e.g. flexible or fix) associated with each loan. Following (Vatne, 2006) 
it is assumed that all contracts are renegotiated at the new rate and the new rate is 
applied immediately to all loans. Additionally, it is assumed that loans are repaid in 
accordance with the original plan without increasing maturity of the contract as 
suggested by Albacete & Fessler (2010) and it is considered that all the mortgage loans 





The application of interest rate shock only focused on households with mortgages 
loan, this subset of households is about 22% of all families (5,182  households were 
surveyed of which 1,126 have  housing credit). The results before and after the 
application of the three scenarios for  interest rates increase, according to the three 
levels of vulnerability are detailed by quartiles  in Table A XI and by household 
composition in Table A XII, in Appendix. In general the impacts are zero or very small. 
For the 1st and 3rd level of vulnerability, the households with 'two adults with three or 
more dependent children' are the most vulnerable after a shock of 1.3 pp or 3pp 
interest rate. Like Johansson & Persson (2006, p. 36) our results show that a sharper 
rise in interest rates does not greatly affect the proportion of households below the 
margin”. 
2.2.2 Scenario of Decrease in Income and Increased in Unemployment Rate 
Two scenarios are considered for disposable income change: a decrease by 1/14 (7%) 
and a decrease by 2/14 (14%). The increase in the unemployment rate adapt and 
update the scenario used in the test of stress applied to Portuguese banks in 2010 
(adverse scenario anticipated for 2012 was 12.9%). The two adverse scenarios 
integrate an unemployment rate of 15% (the unemployment rate in the second 
quarter of the current year equals 15% according the Labour Force Survey (INE, 
2012a)) and a more pessimistic scenario with an employment rate of 17%. 
Table I shows the strong impact of income decrease in particular in the bottom income 





where a large majority (or even the all group) of the households in that group became 
vulnerable. 
TABLE I 
EFFECTS OF INCOME DECREASE 
 
TABLE II 





 Level of 
Vulnerability




 Level of 
Vulnerability
% of Vulnerable 
Households 
Before -> After Before -> After
10.8%-> 15% 55.3%->56.8% 75.6%->76.6%
10.8%-> 17% 55.3%->57.5% 75.6%->77.2%
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from 
the EU-SILC 2010 database.





The application of the shock of unemployment only focused on families with active 
individuals, and uses the EU_SILC question about work intensity in the household. 
There were four answer options with two limit options: the household members 
worked 12 months during the year precedent to the survey, or, during that period they 
did not work at all. Figure 6 shows the results for the vulnerability level 1 and 3 , for 
each level of work intensity in the household, and illustrates the positive impact 
employment has on lower levels of vulnerability. The impact of 15% and 17% in the 
unemployment rate level, assuming 2010 as base year with approximately 11% of 
unemployment rate (the annual average of the unemployment rate in 2010 was 10,8% 
according to INE, 2011b) was computed by the following way (results are shown in 
Table II): it was assumed that the  changes of the unemployed in all the active 
population (e.g. a change from  11% in 2010 to 15%) have a correspondent change in 
the percentage of unemployed households in the total of households (in 2010 was 
19.9%), and the increase of unemployment only affect the households with intensity of 
work of zero or one. So, the increase in the households with all members unemployed 
is equal to the decrease in the number of households where all members are 
employed. Consequently, the structure of the households regarding work intensity 
changed and the vulnerability measures (level 1 and level 3) were recalculated based 
on a new weighted mean. The impact exists but is relatively low in percentual points: 








FIGURE 6 – Work Intensity of the Household and Vulnerability (level 1 and level 3), 
percentage in each household work intensity group. 
 
TABLE III 
 SUMMARY OF EFFECTS OF THE THREE SHOCKS 
 
 
Summing up, the impacts of an income decrease have a large impact on household 
vulnerability and the effect of interest rate increase is very small and directly only in 
small share of total population. An increase in unemployment rate affects household 
vulnerability but in a lower scale compared with income decrease (Table III). Johansson 









Less than 6 
months 
employed





Vuln 3 Vuln 1
Interest Rate Increases 
a
 (in percentage point) Unemployment Rate Increases 
b





 Level of 
Vulnerability




 Level of 
Vulnerability




 Level of 
Vulnerability




 Level of 
Vulnerability




 Level of 
Vulnerability




 Level of 
Vulnerability
% of Vulnerable 
Households 
Before -> After Before -> After Before -> After Before -> After Before -> After Before -> After
1.3 pp 54.71% -> 54.80% 73.45% -> 73.45% 10.8%-> 15% 55.3%->56.8% 75.6%->76.6% 7% 57.7% -> 62.9% 79.6%->83.2%
2 pp 54.71% -> 54.88% 73.45% -> 73.62% 10.8%-> 17% 55.3%->57.5% 75.6%->77.2% 14% 57.7% -> 67.8% 79.6%->86.1%
3 pp 54.71% -> 54.97% 73.45% -> 73.62%
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.
(a)   The interest rate shock was only applied to households with mortgage loan (N=1,126). See Tables A XI and A XII for households
         vulnerability by disposable income quartiles and household composition.





significantly the proportion of households below the margin. In the same way, 
Sugawara & Zalduendo (2011), testing a devaluation in currency exchange rate (in 
combination with interest rate and unemployment shocks) conclude that the 
additional households facing financial distress are few. Both findings converge with 
these empirical results. Table III summarizes the effects of each shock. 
To compute the potential bank losses as a result of adverse shocks applied in the 
previous sections a 4
th
 and final step would be necessary. It should include the 
computation of EAD's and LGD's given by the expressions (3) and (4). The Notice 
(Aviso) of Bank of Portugal No 5/2007 (BdP, 2007) defines the method of calculating 
LGD associated with risk exposures (for institutions not allowed to use their own 
estimates of LGD), PD and EAD. It also defines the need for periodic tests of stress in 
banking system. These formulas for EAD, LGD and PD, cannot be replicated in the 
present research, even in a simplified format. The main data to carry out that exercise 






3 Conclusions and Future Research  
The current financial crisis has highlighted the importance of the research in 
Household Finance and in particular the behaviour of families in managing their 
financial resources and debts. Much of the literature on household debt focuses 
exclusively on the impact on the banking system. This research focuses on the financial 
vulnerability of households from the perspective of diagnosis and prospective analysis, 
which could be a first step in the research of the impact of families’ financial status on 
banks. While stress tests have been conducted for banks, they have also become more 
common for families over recent years. This dissertation adapts methodologies applied 
to other economies’ performances, and, to the author’s knowledge, carries out the 
first stress test on Portuguese households, using the latest available micro data 
obtained by Portuguese household surveys, the SILC 2010 (INE, 2012c). 
In the first part of the empirical analysis, the financial situation of Portuguese 
Households is diagnosed. Then macroeconomic shocks - a decrease in income, 
unemployment and interest rate increases - are applied and their impact on household 
financial vulnerability is analyzed. This study introduces some differences compared to 
previous tests on the stress and financial vulnerability of households. It introduces 
different levels of vulnerability and explores new variables (for example, it examines 
the quantitative impact of an unexpected expense on the financial margin). This work 
is innovative in that it combines quantitative data with qualitative data. Furthermore it 
is comparable with previous studies using similar methodologies and can be replicated 





The analysis of the financial situation of households shows that those holding credit 
have on average higher incomes, and situations of greater vulnerability appear in 
families with lower income levels. These results converge with those of the previous 
literature. The results from the prospective analysis also converge with most of the 
empirical literature on other countries, in particular after current crisis. A rise in the 
unemployment rate has a more negative impact on the vulnerabilities of households 
than a rise in interest rates. After a rise in interest rate by 3pp, the  financial margin  in 
relation to disposable income (the difference between income and  basic household 
expenditures) increases from -29.55% to -29.84%, and the margin for unexpected 
expenses over 400 Euros increases from -64.11% to -64.52%. A decrease of 14% in 
income results in an increase in the number of families with a negative margin from 
57.7% to 67.8% (1
st
 vulnerability level) and from 79.6% to 86.1% (3
rd
 vulnerability 
level), and a rise in unemployment from 10.8% to 17% leads to an increase in 
percentage of vulnerable households from 55.3% to 57.5% (1
st
 vulnerability level) and 
from 75.6% to 77.2% (3
rd
 vulnerability level). The impact on the level of vulnerability 
differs according to family composition and the income quartile to which it belongs. 
Families belonging to the bottom income quartile are the most vulnerable regardless 
of the extent of vulnerability measure used. Single parents and families composed of 
couples with dependent children are the most vulnerable types of households. 
The methodology used in this study makes it possible to bridge the gap that currently 
exists between the collection of data from households and the dissemination of 





identification of the types of families that are most vulnerable, an aspect not covered 
in the financial and banking statistics. 
One limitation of this study is that the analysis of the vulnerability of families and their 
financial margins are considered on the basis of information on income only, and it 
ignores wealth. However, in the current crisis this is essential. Nonetheless, because 
data on accumulated wealth for each family are ignored, the results about vulnerability 
could be overestimated. 
A main avenue for future research would be to apply the methodology suggested in 
section 2.2.2 4
th
 phase: identification of transmission channels between the financial 
vulnerability of households and the banking system, and quantification of the potential 
impact of macroeconomic shocks. This would make it possible to obtain an estimate of 
potential bank losses, and thus assess the sustainability of the financial system as a 
whole. Other relevant points for continuation of this research could involve: the 
application of an exogenous shock to the level of depreciation of real assets, i.e. 
devaluation of the value of the property under mortgage; and definition of a new 
measure of vulnerability achieved by restructuring the debt held by families, such as an 
increased period of funding. 
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TABLE A I 











Period of Information 
(Frequency)
Literature
European Union Statistics 

















Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey 
(HFCS)




Late 2010/ Early 2011 -








Central Credit Register Bank of Portugal No Monthly (c) 
Household Wealth and 
Indebtedness Survey (IPEF)







Inquérito à Situação 
Financeira das Familias
(ISFF)




 - (e) 
Household Budget Survey. 












Source: Table constructed by the author based on: European Central Bank (2012), 
                Eurostat (2012), INE (2006), INE (2011), INE (2012c) and HFCN (2009).
(*)   This table is not exhaustive. It does not include, for example, information produced by the statistical
          authorities of each country.
(**) The 2008 survey includes a special ad hoc module on Over-Indebtedness.
 (a)    Aniola & Golás (2012); Fondeville et al (2010); Albacete & Fessler (2010). Period of analysis: 2008, and         
         Gomez-Salvador et al (2011). Period of analysis: 2007.
(b)   Georgarakos et al (2009). Period of analysis: 1994-2001.
(c)   Farinha & Lacerda (2010). Period of analysis: January to May 2010.
(d)  Farinha (2003); Farinha (2004). Period of analysis: 1994-2000,
        Farinha & Noorali (2004). Period of analysis: 2000,
       Cardoso et al (2008). Period of analysis: 2006, and
       Farinha (2007). Period of analysis: Last quarter 2006 and first quarter 2007







TABLE A II 





Issue Areas and Questions Reference Period
Interest (question A22) and Monthly 
Installments of Housing Loan 
(questions A20 and A23 )
Last Installment Paid
Rent (question A27) Last Rent Paid
Burden of Housing Costs (question A31 )
Time of Interview
Financial Capability (question A33) Time of Interview
Indebtedness due to Consumer Credit 
and Credit Card (question A34 ) and 
Arrears in Payments (question A36)
Time of Interview 
(A34); Past 12 Months 
(A36)
Unexpected Expense (question A37 )
Time of Interview




Minimum Monthly Income Needed to 




Interest (question A64) and Annual 







Age (question I3 ) Date of Birth
Employment Status (question I12 )
Time of Interview








Net Monthly Income from Work for 




Source: Table adapted by the author based on INE (2009, p.18 and 19) and INE (2012c).














TABLE A III 














Qual o valor mensal pago de juros (de crédito à 
habitação)?
Do you know the amount of interest you paid on 
your mortgage in the last 12 months? 
If yes specify that amount. 
c 
HS011
Nos últimos 12 meses (anteriores à entrevista) o 
agregado atrasou algum dos seguintes pagamentos 
regulares, por dificuldades económicas: 
A36-1: Rendas ou prestações de crédito à habitação 
relativas à residência principal.
In the last 12 months, did it happen that the 
household was unable to pay rent or to make a 
mortgage repayment for the main dwelling on 
time, due to financial difficulties?
HS021
A36-2: Despesas correntes (água, electricidade, gás 
e condomínio) relativas à residência principal.
In the last 12 months, did it happen that the 
household was unable to pay utility bills (heating, 
electricity, gas, refuse collection) for the main 
dwelling on time, due to financial difficulties? 
HS031
A36-3: Despesas não relacionadas com a residência 
principal - empréstimos para compra de bens ou 
serviços (por exemplo, para automóvel, férias, 
mobiliário, computador, roupa), utilização de 
cartão de crédito, leasings, ….
In the last 12 months, did it happen that the 
household was unable to pay hire purchase 
installments or other loan payments (besides 
mortgage repayments) on time, due to financial 
difficulties?
A37 HS060
Se surgisse uma despesa inesperada de cerca de 
400 Euros, conseguiria o agregado pagá-la de 
imediato sem recorrer a empréstimo?
Can your household afford an unexpected expense 
of 1145 Euros without borrowing?
Tendo em conta o rendimento total do agregado, 
como é que o agregado consegue gerir todas as 
despesas habituais?
A household may have different sources of income 
and more than one household member may 
contribute to it. 
Concerning your household total monthly or 
weekly income, with which degree of ease or 
difficulty is the household able to make ends 
meet? 
1. Com grande dificuldade 1. With great difficulty 
2.Com dificuldade 2. With difficulty 
3. Com alguma dificuldade 3. With some difficulty 
4. Com alguma facilidade 4. Fairly easily 
5. Com facilidade 5. Easily 
6. Com grande facilidade 6. Very easily
9. NS/NR
A39 HS130
Pense em todas as despesas com as quais o 
agregado tem de lidar habitualmente. Indique 
aproximadamente, qual o rendimento mínimo 
mensal necessário para fazer face às despesas 
habituais?
In your opinion what is the very lowest net 
monthly income your household would need to 
make ends meet?
Source: Table constructed by the author based on INE (2012c) and Eurostat (2010).
(*)  Most of the questions among the different countries are coincidente, however a detailed analysis of portuguese, UK and irish
        questionnaires reveals differences in some questions content. This fact creates problems of comparability. The above 
        questions in portuguese and english versions are comparable. The European Union Quality Reports are produced annually by 
        Eurostat based on the quality reports provided by countries. The quality report for 2010 questionnaire is not available.
(a)   Questions taken from EU- SILC Questionnaire for Portugal 2010. 
(b)   Questions taken from EU- SILC Questionnaire for Ireland 2010.








TABLE A IV 





TABLE A V 











Delay in Payment of 
Loans or the 



















Total 5,182 7% 7% 28% 4% 80% 10%
1
st
 Income Quartile 1,295 14% 12% 49% 8% 95% 23%
2
nd
 Income Quartile 1,296 8% 10% 35% 5% 90% 12%
3
rd
 Income Quartile 1,296 6% 6% 22% 3% 81% 6%
4
th
 Income Quartile 1,295 2% 2% 8% 1% 52% 1%
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.See also Tables AVIIa e AVIIb.









Delay in Payment 
of Loans or the 
Provision of 




















Total 5,182 7% 7% 28% 4% 80% 10%
One adult 1,070 3% 5% 40% 3% 81% 18%
Two adults without dependent 
children both <65 years
649 5% 5% 25% 4% 74% 6%
Two adults without dependent 
children at least one adult aged 65 
years or more
1,053 2% 4% 23% 2% 77% 9%
 Other households without 
dependent children
699 8% 6% 21% 3% 80% 8%
One adult with one or more 
dependent children
160 13% 14% 55% 16% 91% 18%
Two adults with one dependent 
child
557 8% 7% 26% 6% 80% 8%
Two adults with two dependent 454 7% 7% 21% 4% 80% 4%
Two adults with three or more 
dependent children
102 18% 17% 42% 16% 82% 23%
Other households with one or 
more dependent children
438 10% 9% 28% 7% 84% 11%
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.See also Tables AVIIa e AVIIb.





TABLE A VI 
















EU-SILC Original Variable Variable Code
Household disposable income (annual) hy020
Late payment of rent or monthly housing loan HS011
Delay in current expenditure on housing HS021
Delay in payment of loans or in provision of goods or services 
purchased (excluding housing) HS031
Capacity to handle unexpected expenses HS060
Ability to make ends meet and usual charges HS120
Monthly minimum income to meet expenses and charges HS130
Interest paid on housing loans with mortgage HY100N
Household Composition hx060
Poverty Indicator hx080
Income per Adult Equivalent (in €) hx090
Severe material deprivation hx110





TABLE A VIIa 
ORIGINAL VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
 
 
TABLE A VIIb 






[1] Household disposable income (annual)  -
[2]
Delay in Payment of Rent or Monthly Mortgage Loan 
(dummy) =1 if delay, 0 otherwise
[3] Delay in Current Expenditure on Housing (dummy) =1 if delay, 0 otherwise
[4]
Delay in Payment of Loans or the Provision of Goods or 
Services Purchased (excluding housing) (dummy) =1 if delay, 0 otherwise
[5]
Capacity to Handle Unexpected Expenses (dummy)
=1 if haven't capacity to handle 
unexpected debt, 0 otherwise
[6]
Ability to Make Ends Meet and Customary Charges 
(dummy)
=1 if haven't capacity to suport usual 
debt, 0 otherwise
[7] Monthly minimum income to meet expenses and charges  -
[8] Interest paid on housing loans with mortgage  -
[9]
Poverty Indicator (dummy)
= 1 if Equivalent disposable income 
equal or above poverty line, 0 
otherwise
[10] Income per Adult Equivalent (in €)  -
[11]
Severe Material Deprivation (dummy)
= 1 if With Severe Material 
Deprivation, 0 otherwise
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.





Valid N Missings Mean Median Std Deviation Minimum Maximum
[1] Household disposable income (annual) 5,182 5,182 0 17,451 13,601 14,514 440 177,576
[2] Delay in Payment of Rent or Monthly Mortgage Loan 
b
5,182 2,428 2,754 0.07 0 0.25 0 1.00
[3] Delay in Current Expenditure on Housing 
b
5,182 5,161 21 0.04 0 0.21 0 1.00
[4]
Delay in Payment of Loans or the Provision of Goods 
or Services Purchased (excluding housing) 
b
5,182 1,461 3,721 0.07 0 0.25 0 1.00
[5] Capacity to Handle Unexpected Expenses 
b
5,182 5,165 17 0.28 0 0.45 0 1.00
[6] Ability to Make Ends Meet and Customary Charges 
b
5,182 5,177 5 0.80 1.00 0.40 0 1.00
[7]
Monthly minimum income to meet expenses and 
charges 5,182 5,040 142 1,282 1,000 1,068 50 50,000
[8] Interest paid on housing loans with mortgage 5,182 5,182 0 457 0 1,175 0 28,047
[9] Poverty Indicator 
b
5,182 5,182 0 0.21 0 0.41 0 1.00
[10] Income per Adult Equivalent (in €) 5,182 5,182 0 10,111 7,934 7,821 207 88,237
[11] Severe Material Deprivation 
b
5,182 5,182 0 0.10 0 0.31 0 1.00
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.
 (*)   See descripion of the original variables from EU-SILC 2010 in Table A VI.
(a)   N: Number of observations.





TABLE A VIIIa 




Variable Description Variable Composition 
*
[1] Monthly Disposable Income (€ per household) hy020/14
[2] Monthly Margin (€ per household) Mdinc-HS130
[3] Percentual Margin mgdibiM/Mdinc
[4]
Monthly Margin After Unexpected Expenses of 400 Euros (€ per 
household) mgdibiM-400
[5] Percentual Margin After Unexpected Expenses of 400 Euros mgl400M/Mdinc
[6] Percentual Margin (dummy) =1 if mgperM<0, 0 otherwise
[7] Percentual Margin After Unexpected Expenses of 400 Euros (dummy) =1 if mgl400Mper<0, 0 otherwise
[8] 1st Vulnerability Level =mg_YNR
[9] 2nd Vulnerability Level =1 if mgperM< -0.2, 0 otherwise
[10] 3rd Vulnerability Level =mgl400_YNR
[11] Monthly Interest of Mortgage Loan (€ per household) HY100N/12
[12] Households with Mortgage Loan =1 if intM>0, 0 otherwise
[13] Increase on Monthly Interest Rate Paid by 1.3 p.p. (€ per household) =0.013*intM
[14] Increase on Monthly Interest Rate Paid by 2 p.p. (€ per household) =0.02*intM
[15] Increase on Monthly Interest Rate Paid by 3 p.p. (€ per household) =0.03*intM
[16]
Impact of the Rise in Monthly Interest Rate by 1.3 p.p. on Monthly 
Minimum Income to Meet Expenses and Charges (€ per household) =HS130+ir1
[17]
Impact of the Rise in Monthly Interest Rate by 2 p.p. on Monthly 
Minimum Income to Meet Expenses and Charges (€ per household) =HS130+ir2
[18]
Impact of the Rise in Monthly Interest Rate by 3 p.p. on Monthly 
Minimum Income to Meet Expenses and Charges (€ per household) =HS130+ir3
[19] Monthly Margin After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. (€ per household) Mdinc-Chir1
[20] Monthly Margin After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. (€ per household) Mdinc-Chir2
[21] Monthly Margin After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. (€ per household) Mdinc-Chir3
[22] Percentual Margin After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. mgMAir1/Mdinc
[23] Percentual Margin After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. mgMAir2/Mdinc
[24] Percentual Margin After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. mgMAir3/Mdinc
[25]
Monthly Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. (€ 
per household) Mdinc-Chir1-400
[26]
Monthly Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. (€ 
per household) Mdinc-Chir2-400
[27]
Monthly Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. (€ 
per household) Mdinc-Chir3-400
[28] Percent. Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. mgMl400Air1/Mdinc
[29] Percent. Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. mgMl400Air2/Mdinc
[30] Percent. Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. mgMl400Air3/Mdinc
[31] 1st Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. =1 if mgperMAir1<0, 0 otherwise
[32] 1st Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. =1 if mgperMAir2<0, 0 otherwise
[33] 1st Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. =1 if mgperMAir3<0, 0 otherwise
[34] 2nd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. =1 if mgperMAir1<-0.2, 0 otherwise
[35] 2nd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. =1 if mgperMAir2<-0.2, 0 otherwise
[36] 2nd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. =1 if mgperMAir3<-0.2, 0 otherwise
[37] 3rd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. =1 if mgperMl400Air1<0, 0 otherwise
[38] 3rd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. =1 if mgperMl400Air2<0, 0 otherwise
[39] 3rd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. =1 if mgperMl400Air3<0, 0 otherwise
[40] Original Variable Vs Margin Severe Material Deprivation Vs Margin hx110_YNR - mg_YNR
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.
 (*) See descripion of the original variables from EU-SILC 2010 in Table A VI.
Calculation of Initial 
Margins
Calculation of the Three 
Levels of Vulnerability
Calculation of Margins After 
Increases on Interest Rates
Calculation of the Three 
Levels of Vulnerability 






TABLE A VIIIb 












Valid N Missings Mean Median Std Deviation Minimum Maximum
[1] Monthly Disposable Income (€ per household) 5,182 5,182 0 1,246.50 971.50 1,036.75 31.43 12,684.00
[2] Monthly Margin (€ per household) 5,182 5,040 142 (40.39) (89.69) 1,135.58 (48,672.81) 10,684.00
[3] Percentual Margin 5,182 5,040 142 (0.38) (0.11) 1.55 (48.54) 0.98
[4]
Monthly Margin After Unexpected Expenses of 400 Euros (€ per 
household) 5,182 5,040 142 (440.39) (489.69) 1,135.58 (49,072.81) 10,284.00
[5] Percentual Margin After Unexpected Expenses of 400 Euros 5,182 5,040 142 (0.94) (0.60) 1.98 (58.45) 0.85
[6] Percentual Margin (dummy) 5,182 5,040 142 0.58 1.00 0.49 0 1.00
[7]
Percentual Margin After Unexpected Expenses of 400 Euros 
(dummy) 5,182 5,040 142 0.80 1.00 0.40 0 1.00
[8] 1st Vulnerability Level 5,182 5,040 142 0.58 1.00 0.49 0 1.00
[9] 2nd Vulnerability Level 5,182 5,040 142 0.44 0 0.50 0 1.00
[10] 3rd Vulnerability Level 5,182 5,040 142 0.80 1.00 0.40 0 1.00
[11] Monthly Interest of Mortgage Loan (€ per household) 5,182 1,149 4,033 171.84 150.00 142.27 1.00 2,337.23
[12] Households with Mortgage Loan 5,182 5,182 0 0.22 0 0.42 0 1.00
[13] Increase on Monthly Interest Rate Paid by 1.3 p.p. (€ per household) 5,182 1,149 4,033 2.23 1.95 1.85 0.01 30.38
[14] Increase on Monthly Interest Rate Paid by 2 p.p. (€ per household) 5,182 1,149 4,033 3.44 3.00 2.85 0.02 46.74
[15] Increase on Monthly Interest Rate Paid by 3 p.p. (€ per household) 5,182 1,149 4,033 5.16 4.50 4.27 0.03 70.12
[16]
Impact of the Rise in Monthly Interest Rate by 1.3 p.p. on Monthly 
Minimum Income to Meet Expenses and Charges (€ per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 1,708.53 1,502.38 877.60 300.14 7,008.27
[17]
Impact of the Rise in Monthly Interest Rate by 2 p.p. on Monthly 
Minimum Income to Meet Expenses and Charges (€ per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 1,709.73 1,503.66 877.78 300.21 7,012.73
[18]
Impact of the Rise in Monthly Interest Rate by 3 p.p. on Monthly 
Minimum Income to Meet Expenses and Charges (€ per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 1,711.45 1,505.49 878.03 300.32 7,019.09
[19] Monthly Margin After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. (€ per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 (31.77) (100.83) 1,039.12 (3,795.86) 7,438.29
[20] Monthly Margin After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. (€ per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 (32.97) (101.81) 1,039.08 (3,798.96) 7,436.89
[21] Monthly Margin After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. (€ per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 (34.68) (103.21) 1,039.03 (3,803.38) 7,434.90
[22] Percentual Margin After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 (0.30) (0.07) 1.67 (48.58) 0.89
[23] Percentual Margin After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 (0.30) (0.07) 1.67 (48.61) 0.89
[24] Percentual Margin After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 (0.30) (0.07) 1.68 (48.64) 2.00
[25]
Monthly Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. (€ 
per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 (431.77) (500.83) 1,039.12 (4,195.86) 7,038.29
[26]
Monthly Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. (€ 
per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 (432.97) (501.81) 1,039.08 (4,198.96) 7,036.89
[27]
Monthly Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. (€ 
per household) 5,182 1,126 4,056 (434.68) (503.21) 1,039.03 (4,203.38) 7,034.90
[28] Percent. Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 (0.64) (0.36) 2.01 (58.49) 0.84
[29] Percent. Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 (0.64) (0.37) 2.01 (58.52) 0.84
[30] Percent. Margin After Un. Exp. and After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 (0.65) (0.37) 2.01 (58.55) 0.84
[31] 1st Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.55 1.00 0.50 0 1.00
[32] 1st Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.55 1.00 0.50 0 1.00
[33] 1st Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.55 1.00 0.50 0 1.00
[34] 2nd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.41 0 0.49 0 1.00
[35] 2nd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.41 0 0.49 0 1.00
[36] 2nd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.41 0 0.49 0 1.00
[37] 3rd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 1.3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.73 1.00 0.44 0 1.00
[38] 3rd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 2 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.74 1.00 0.44 0 1.00
[39] 3rd Vulnerability Level After Rise Interest Rate 3 p.p. 5,182 1,126 4,056 0.74 1.00 0.44 0 1.00
[40] Severe Material Deprivation Vs Margin 5,182 5,040 142 (0.47) 0 0.54 (1.00) 1.00
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.
(*) See Table A VIIIa for variable description. Parenthesis "( )" denote negative numbers.





TABLE A IX 
HOUSEHOLDS BY VULNERABILITY LEVELS AND DISPOSABLE INCOME QUARTILES 
 
 
TABLE A X 













% of Vulnerable 
Households
% of Vulnerable 
Households
% of Vulnerable 
Households
Total 5,040 57.7% 44.4% 79.6%
1
st
 Income Quartile 1,260 82.9% 71.0% 99.5%
2
nd
 Income Quartile 1,266 65.2% 52.1% 94.2%
3
rd
 Income Quartile 1,269 50.7% 35.8% 79.1%
4
th
 Income Quartile 1,245 31.6% 18.4% 44.9%
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010
                  database.
 (a)   See secion 2.1.4  'Methodology' for vulnerability criteria and Table A VIIIa for












% of Vulnerable 
Households
% of Vulnerable 
Households
% of Vulnerable 
Households
One adult 1,046 69.50% 55.45% 92.83%
Two adults without dependent children 
both <65 years 628 60.99% 47.93% 79.46%
Two adults without dependent children at 
least one adult aged 65 years or more 1,015 55.86% 42.46% 83.74%
One adult with one or more dependent 
children 160 76.25% 64.37% 91.87%
Two adults with one dependent child 543 59.67% 46.96% 80.29%
Two adults with two dependent children 449 54.12% 39.42% 74.16%
Two adults with three or more dependent 
children 100 58.00% 46.00% 79.00%
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.
 (a)   See secion 2.1.4  'Methodology' for vulnerability criteria and Table A VIIIa for vulnerability measures.
(b)   Two categories of Households were excluded from the analyse: 'other households without dependent 









TABLE A XI 













% of Vulnerable 
Households 
b
% of Vulnerable 
Households 
b
% of Vulnerable 
Households 
b
Before -> After Before -> After Before -> After
1.3 pp
Total 54.71% -> 54.80% 40.94% -> 40.94% 73.45% -> 73.45%
1
st
 Income Quartile 79.08% -> 79.08% 70.92% -> 70.92% 96.81% -> 96.81%
2
nd
 Income Quartile 58.87% -> 58.87% 42.55% -> 42.55% 82.27% -> 82.27%
3
rd
 Income Quartile 52.46% -> 52.82% 35.21% -> 35.21% 74.30% -> 74.30%
4
th
 Income Quartile 28.06% -> 28.06% 14.75% -> 14.75% 39.93% -> 39.93%
2 pp
Total 54.71% -> 54.88% 40.94% -> 41.03% 73.45% -> 73.62%
1
st
 Income Quartile 79.08% -> 79.08% 70.92% -> 71.28% 96.81% -> 96.81%
2
nd
 Income Quartile 58.87% -> 58.87% 42.55% -> 42.55% 82.27% -> 82.27%
3
rd
 Income Quartile 52.46% -> 52.82% 35.21% -> 35.21% 74.30% -> 74.65%
4
th
 Income Quartile 28.06% -> 28.42% 14.75% -> 14.75% 39.93% -> 40.29%
3 pp
Total 54.71% -> 54.97% 40.94% -> 41.03% 73.45% -> 73.62%
1
st
 Income Quartile 79.08% -> 79.43% 70.92% -> 71.28% 96.81% -> 96.81%
2
nd
 Income Quartile 58.87% -> 58.87% 42.55% -> 42.55% 82.27% -> 82.27%
3
rd
 Income Quartile 52.46% -> 52.82% 35.21% -> 35.21% 74.30% -> 74.65%
4
th
 Income Quartile 28.06% -> 28.42% 14.75% -> 14.75% 39.93% -> 40.29%
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010
                  database.
 (a)   See secion 2.1.4  'Methodology' for vulnerability criteria and Table A VIIIa for
         vulnerability measures.
(b)   The interest rate shock was only applied to households with mortgage loan (N=1,126).
Interest Rate Increases (in 








TABLE A XII 











% of Vulnerable 
Households 
c
% of Vulnerable 
Households 
c
% of Vulnerable 
Households 
c
Before -> After Before -> After Before -> After
1.3 pp
One adult 62.22% -> 62.22% 50.00% -> 50.00% 84.44% -> 84.44%
Two adults without dependent children 
both <65 years 57.59% -> 57.59% 43.67% -> 43.67% 74.05% -> 74.05%
Two adults without dependent children at 
least one adult aged 65 years or more 56.10% -> 56.10% 46.34% -> 46.34% 75.61% -> 75.61%
One adult with one or more dependent 
children 67.92% -> 67.92% 54.72% -> 54.72% 84.91% -> 84.91%
Two adults with one dependent child 55.65% -> 55.65% 43.15% -> 43.15% 77.02% -> 77.02%
Two adults with two dependent children 53.91% -> 54.30% 38.28% -> 38.28% 72.27% -> 72.27%
Two adults with three or more dependent 
children 70.00% -> 70.00% 45.00% -> 45.00% 85.00% -> 85.00%
2 pp
One adult 62.22% -> 62.22% 50.00% -> 50.00% 84.44% -> 84.44%
Two adults without dependent children 
both <65 years 57.59% -> 57.59% 43.67% -> 43.67% 74.05% -> 74.68%
Two adults without dependent children at 
least one adult aged 65 years or more 56.10% -> 56.10% 46.34% -> 46.34% 75.61% -> 75.61%
One adult with one or more dependent 
children 67.92% -> 67.92% 54.72% -> 54.72% 84.91% -> 86.79%
Two adults with one dependent child 55.65% -> 55.65% 43.15% -> 43.15% 77.02% -> 77.02%
Two adults with two dependent children 53.91% -> 54.30% 38.28% -> 38.67% 72.27% -> 72.27%
Two adults with three or more dependent 
children 70.00% -> 70.00% 45.00% -> 45.00% 85.00% -> 85.00%
3 pp
One adult 62.22% -> 62.22% 50.00% -> 50.00% 84.44% -> 84.44%
Two adults without dependent children 
both <65 years 57.59% -> 57.59% 43.67% -> 43.67% 74.05% -> 74.68%
Two adults without dependent children at 
least one adult aged 65 years or more 56.10% -> 56.10% 46.34% -> 46.34% 75.61% -> 75.61%
One adult with one or more dependent 
children 67.92% -> 67.92% 54.72% -> 54.72% 84.91% -> 86.79%
Two adults with one dependent child 55.65% -> 55.65% 43.15% -> 43.15% 77.02% -> 77.02%
Two adults with two dependent children 53.91% -> 54.30% 38.28% -> 38.67% 72.27% -> 72.27%
Two adults with three or more dependent 
children 70.00% -> 70.00% 45.00% -> 45.00% 85.00% -> 85.00%
Source:   Table constructed by the author based on microdata from the EU-SILC 2010 database.
 (a)   See secion 2.1.4  'Methodology' for vulnerability criteria and Table A VIIIa for vulnerability measures.
(b)   Two categories of Households were excluded from the analyse ('other households without dependent 
        children' and 'other households with one or more dependent children'.
(c)   The interest rate shock was only applied to households with mortgage loan (N=1,126).
Interest Rate Increases (in percentage 
point) by Household Composition 
b
Vulnerability Level 
a
